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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S STANDING GROUP

Annex 4

MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO ISOLATE CUBA AND COMBAT CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

The status of action taken and pending in multilateral bodies to isolate Cuba and to counteract Castro-Communist subversion is as follows:

Organization of American States (OAS)

On the Cuban Problem:

1. At the Punta del Este Meeting of Foreign Ministers (January, 1962) it was decided (a) to exclude the Castro regime from further participation in the various bodies of the inter-American system and (b) to place an embargo on arms shipments to Cuba and authorize the Council of the OAS (COAS) to extend this embargo to other items.
2. During the past 15 months the exclusion decision has been fully implemented, with the sole exception of the Pan American Sanitary Organization. Because of special considerations it was decided to be in the national interest to permit Cuba to continue to participate in that body. A Special Committee of the COAS has under study extension of the trade embargo. The President has approved our seeking COAS action along these lines:
 - a) extend the embargo to include all items of trade except foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies.
 - b) recommend that member states prohibit the use of their vessels to carry to Cuba any embargoed items.
 - c) recommend that member states deny overflights and landing rights to Soviet aircraft on bloc-Cuban runs.
 - d) call upon the rest of the free world to take similar measures.
3. In connection with the missile crisis last October the COAS decided to apply the Rio Treaty and, serving provisionally as Organ of Consultation

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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under the Treaty, adopted a resolution

authorizing the quarantine

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Rio Treaty action in this situation has not been terminated so that the CCAS continues in its role of Organ of Consultation and could take further Rio Treaty action in the Cuban case should this become necessary.

On the Communist Subversion Problem:

1. At the same Punta del Este meeting the Foreign Ministers in Resolution II decided on a series of measures to counteract Castro-communist subversion:

- (a) to direct the CCAS to maintain all necessary vigilance against acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in the hemisphere and to make recommendations to the governments for dealing with such acts.
- (b) to authorize the establishment of a Special Consultation Committee on Security (SCCS) to advise the governments and the CCAS, upon request, regarding security matters.
- (c) to urge the member governments to take appropriate steps for their individual and collective self-defense and to cooperate as necessary to strengthen their capacity to counteract the threats arising from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers.

2. The Foreign Ministers met informally in Washington on October 2-3, 1962 to consider the increasing seriousness of the Cuban situation, particularly in the light of the Soviet arms buildup. Among the decisions taken was a request that special studies be undertaken urgently of the transfer of funds to other American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques.

3. By the


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GROUP 1- Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

3. By way of implementing the decisions referred to in the two previous paragraphs, the COAS has had a Special Committee prepare a report on Soviet intervention in the hemisphere and the problem of communist subversion. This report has been completed and is ready for presentation to the COAS for action.

4. The COAS in March 1962 established the SCCS. During the first year of its operation, the Committee has prepared a very useful initial general report on the problem of communist subversion, advised the Dominican Government on how to improve its security capabilities, and collaborated with the COAS Special Committee in the drafting of the report mentioned in the previous paragraph.

5. The third paragraph of Resolution II of Punta del Este provides an ample umbrella for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in counteracting communist subversion.




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SPECIAL CENTRAL AMERICAN ARRANGEMENTS


1. Pursuant to the decision taken by the Presidents at the San José meeting, the Ministers of Government, Interior and/or Security of the seven countries met in Managua, Nicaragua, April 3-4, 1963.



2. To follow up the Managua decisions a team of US representatives will travel to each of the Isthmian countries beginning April 23, 1963 to determine what US training and material assistance they might need to enable them to carry out the measures as well as the extent of the progress made to date.

UNITED NATIONS


1. The October missile crisis was wound up formally on January 7, 1963 in the form of a joint letter from Ambassador Stevenson and First Deputy Minister V. Kuznetsov to the Secretary-General which stated that "while it has not been possible for our Governments to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time."



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
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
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